风险规避制造商市场入侵策略
作者:
作者单位:

1. 南京理工大学 经济管理学院,南京 210094;2. 惠州学院 经济管理学院,广东 惠州 516007

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通讯作者:

E-mail: huaming@njust.edu.cn.

中图分类号:

F272.3

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目(71571102);江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目(KYCX19_0354, KYCX20_0348).


Market encroachment strategy of risk-averse manufacturer
Author:
Affiliation:

1. School of Economic and Management,Nanjing University of Science and Technology,Nanjing 210094,China;2. School of Economics and Management,Huizhou University,Huizhou 516007,China

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    摘要:

    针对由风险中性的在位制造商、风险规避的外来制造商和风险中性零售商组成的二级供应链系统,基于Stackelberg博弈理论建立不同市场入侵策略下的决策模型,研究风险规避的外来制造商市场入侵策略选择问题,分析市场入侵和风险规避行为对供应链成员均衡决策的影响.研究发现:当外来制造商通过零售商销售产品时,损害在位制造商的利润,但对零售商有利;当外来制造商通过网络渠道直接向消费者销售产品时,不一定损害在位制造商的利润,存在帕累托改进区域;当外来制造商的风险规避程度较大时,价格战愈发激烈,对自身、在位制造商和零售商都是不利的;外来制造商的市场入侵策略受质量差异程度、风险规避程度、生产成本和直销成本的综合影响;外来制造商选择最优的市场入侵策略时,损害在位制造商的利润,而且供应链系统不能实现帕累托改进.

    Abstract:

    A two-level supply chain is studied which includes a risk-neutral incumbent manufacturer, a risk-averse external manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer. Supply chain models under different encroachment strategies based on the Stackelberg game theory, are established to explore the encroachment strategy of the risk-averse external manufacturer, and analysis the impact of encroachment and risk aversion on the equilibrium decision of supply chain members. The results show that when the external manufacturer sells products through the retailer, it hurts the profit of the incumbent manufacturer, but it benefits the retailer. Pareto improvement areas exist when the external manufacturer sells products directly through online channels. With the increase of the degree of risk aversion of the external manufacturer, the price war has become increasingly fierce, which is disadvantageous to itself, the incumbent manufacturer and the retailer. The market encroachment strategy of the external manufacturer is affected by the combination of quality differences, risk aversion, production costs and selling cost. When the external manufacturer selects the optimal encroachment strategy, it hurts the profit of the incumbent manufacturer and the supply chain system can't achieve Pareto improvement.

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引用本文

许前,吕一帆,黄甫,等.风险规避制造商市场入侵策略[J].控制与决策,2021,36(10):2528-2536

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  • 在线发布日期: 2021-08-18
  • 出版日期: 2020-10-20